Title: | United States coal industry accident data including fatalities and days lost, and disability and serious injury days for 2001 to 2010 |
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Source: | Coal Age |
Date: | Jan 2012 |
Price: | $20.00 |
Categories: |
Start of full article - but without data
Table
Accident Data
Year Fatality NDL NFDL Days Lost FD-Days SI-Days
2001 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2002 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2003 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2004 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2005 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2006 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2007 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2008 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XX,XXX XXX,XXX 2009 X XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2010 XX XXXX 1951 XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX
Full article
For mine safety, the decade 1991-2000 was outstanding for underground coal mining in many ways. Although the number of mines diminished from X,XXX to XXX, a XX.X% reduction, the number of employees fell from XX,XXX to XX,XXX (XX.X% reduction), and coal production decreased from XXX million tons to XXX million (X.X% reduction), on the positive side, the productivity increased by XX.X% from X.XX tons per employee hour to X.XX. The decade began with XX fatalities and ended with a record low lX--amazing at the time. Significantly, the NFDL IR steadily decreased from XX.XX to X.XX, a XX% reduction. However, the Fatal IR remained fiat (X.XX to X.XX), and the single mine disaster at Southmountain mine No. X in 1992 caused eight miners to die.
Certainly, the decade 2001-2010 was a mixed bag of good and bad, with many challenges along the way. The impacts of mine disasters had a profound effect on safety, enforcement, production, employment and productivity. A steady decline in safety statistics was marred in four of XX years, with the following multiple-fatality major-hazard events, with impacts noted in some detail:
* 2001: JWR No. X explosion (XX fatalities); the usual high-impact visibility was overshadowed by the media coverage of the aftermath of X-XX, and thus no new mine safety legislation was initiated.
* 2006: Sago mine (XX fatalities), Aracoma Alma No. X mine (two fatalities), and Darby No. X mine (five fatalities); Congress passed the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act, fines increased dramatically, new technology was implemented, new training was mandated, other provisions took hold, and it took until the end of 2008 for enforcement impacts to be fully realized.
* 2007: Crandall Canyon (nine fatalities); this event heightened the already high scrutiny on underground coal mines and prolonged the transition time on stabilization.
* 2010: Upper Big Branch mine-South (XX fatalities); Congress pursued new legislation, but with multiple investigations pending, none was passed. However, because of Congressional and media scrutiny of the worst disaster in XX years, MSHA took action by implementing impact inspections, a new potential pattern of violations (PPOV) process, POV rulemaking, and the Rules to Live By initiative.
The number of mines again declined from XXX to XXX, by XX.X%, but the number of employees increased from XX,XXX to XX,XXX, by XX.X%; however, the low point occurred in 2003 with XX,XXX employees (See Table X). Total production declined by XX.X million tons, and productivity decreased dramatically from X.XX in 2001 to X.XX in 2010, a XX.X% reduction, while the average number of hours worked per year per employee increased from X,XXX to XXXX, a X.X% increase. During this period, a large transition in the workforce began in earnest, with baby boomers retiring and taking their experience with them. Now approximately XX% of the workforce has five or fewer years' experience. This is, however, only partially the answer for the dramatic decrease in productivity.
Overall statistics on accidents are given in Table X, but with separate statistics presented on fatalities and disabilities (F-D, including partial disabilities) and serious injuries (SI, defined as lost or restricted days of XX or more). These statistics are used to calculate normalized safety measures.
Table X reveals a steady and dramatic decline in the NFDL IR (XX.X% reduction), the NDL IR (XX.X%) and the SI-SM (XX.X%). The Fatal IR reached a record low of X.XXX in 2009, with a record low six fatalities, but was marred greatly by very high IRs in 2001, 2006, 2007 and 2010. The elimination of disasters remains the underground coal sector's greatest challenge, and unfortunately, the events impact all sectors of the mining industry.
Policymakers React
Another major impact from disasters comes from Congressional and media scrutiny, as the rescue and recovery operation unfolds, some times over many days. The public senses the isolation of desperate miners, the agony of the families, and the pressure of a timeline after which no recovery may be possible. The disaster scenes ultimately lead to warranted public outrage and intense pressure on Congress and MSHA to do something to prevent another disaster. A major consequence of the scrutiny is legislation and/or rulemaking, followed by changed enforcement. Unlike the aftermath of the Jim Walter Resources disaster in 2001, the Sago mine rescue and recovery operation carried on for four long days, and ended with one miner left alive among the XX who found shelter. In all rescue and recovery operations, mistakes are made, but in this operation, an ill-fated cell-phone call caused more grief and another outrage by Congress. Quickly, the MINER Act was passed with bi-partisan support, and with it came intense scrutiny from MSHA and Congress, elevated fines and more frequent enforcement action.
Table X shows the statistics, which highlight the heightened enforcement. Beginning in 2006, and extending through 2008, the number of citations, S&S-designated citations, and orders grew dramatically, by XX.X%, XX% and XX.X%, respectively, over 2005 levels. The number of inspection hours increased by XX% and the total proposed penalty assessments rose by XXX% over 2005. Similarly, the proposed penalty assessments for S&S-designated citations and orders rose by XX.X% and XX.X%, respectively. Table X also reveals that 2009 enforcement actions and penalties dropped significantly from 2008, but because of the Upper Big Branch mine-South disaster in 2010, S&S-designated citations and orders rose dramatically, even beyond the highest levels realized in 2008. All is not bad news though.
In spite of the dramatic increases in total citations and inspection hours as well as numbers of citations, Table X shows that the citations per XXX inspection hours (C/XXX IH), S&S-designated citations per XXX inspection hours (SS/XXX IH) and orders per XXX inspections hours peaked in 2006. The rates decreased significantly through 2009, by XX.X% (through 2010), XX.X% (through 2009) and XX.X% for C/XXX IH, SS/XXX IH, and O/XXX IH, respectively. Because of the Upper Big Branch mine-South disaster, the SS/XXX IH and O/XXX IH rates increased in 2010. It is useful to note the percent S&S citations and percent orders also decreased similarly through 2009, and increased in 2010. This indicates there is a strong correlation between the occurrence of a disaster in a particular year and the level of enforcement in reaction to it; however, as demonstrated in the period following 2006, these enforcement levels tend to moderate as industry addresses the additional scrutiny, apparently through greater diligence in maintaining compliance with major hazard-related regulations, which tend to get more elevated citations. This is good news, and hopefully is indicative of a growing movement by many mining companies to change the safety culture in their workforces to one of diligence and prevention.
For completeness, Table X shows the normalized fiscal impact of efforts to reduce enforcement actions. The average proposed penalty assessments on citations and elevated citations also diminished significantly from 2007 through 2009, by XX.X%, XX.X%, XX.X% and XX.X%, respectively, for average proposed penalty per citation (PP/C), average proposed penalty per S&S-designated citation (PP/SS), average proposed penalty per order (PP/O) and average proposed penalties per XXX inspection hours (PP/XXX IH). Following the UBB disaster, the trend was reversed, as would be expected.
Productivity Declines
Getting back to productivity, after a fiat record during 2001-2004, with 2004 seeing a modest decrease, productivity began a dramatic, steady decline thereafter. There was a relatively large increase in the number of employees from 2004 to 2005 and there was a distinct increase in the citation and S&S-designated citation rates. Of course in 2006, these rates and the order rate increased even more dramatically, as did the proposed penalty assessments. Thus the more intense level of enforcement, coupled with large changes in mines to implement new provisions of the MINER Act, could have had a significant impact on productivity. Although the intensity of enforcement action rates subsided during 2008 and 2009, after reaching a peak in 2007, productivity continues to decline as the workforce transition continues. We now await realization of the next round of legislative action and finalization of several rules in various stages of rulemaking.
The record year in 2009 for all of the incident rates was excellent. The normalized citation measures similarly decreased. The underground coal industry is in large part responsible for building the safety cultures across their mines that can sustain that level of performance, and MSHA must maintain the scrutiny over mines to ensure that 'bad players' don't disrupt this trend again. At this point, the industry and MSHA are focused on the same outcomes, which are driven by the goals of zero fatalities and zero lost-time accidents. In 2009, the goal of zero fatalities was so close. Hopefully, 2012 will be the year. Nonetheless, we are all hopeful that all of the aforementioned normalized measures continue dramatically downward, and we can be proud of our joint accomplishments.
Grayson is program officer, mining engineering, Penn State (Tel: XXX-XXX-XXXX; E-mail: rlgXX@psu.edu). Kinilakodi is a graduate student at Penn State.
Table X--Data on Mines, Employees, Production and Productivity
Man-hours Production Hours/ Tons/ Year Mines Miners (millions) (millions) Miner Hour
2001 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2002 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2003 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2004 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2005 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2006 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2007 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2008 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2009 XXX XX,XXX XX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX 2010 XXX XX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXX,XXX,XXX XXXX X.XX
Table X--Accident Data
Year Fatality NDL NFDL Days Lost FD-Days SI-Days
2001 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2002 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2003 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2004 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2005 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2006 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2007 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2008 XX XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XX,XXX XXX,XXX 2009 X XXXX XXXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX 2010 XX XXXX 1951 XXX,XXX XXX,XXX XXX,XXX
Table X--Normalized Accident Measures
Year Mines Fatal IR NDL IR NFDL IR SM FD-SM SI-SM
2001 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2002 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2003 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2004 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2005 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2006 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2007 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2008 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2009 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX 2010 XXX X.XXX X.XX X.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX XXX.XX
Table X--Citation and Penalty Data
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